

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 085247

62

ORIGIN EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 H-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-15

ACDA-10 EUR-12 TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05 /094 R

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P 082306Z APR 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 085247

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, MARR, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: SFRC HEARING ON KOREA-ABRAMOWITZ STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BEFORE THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON APRIL 8.

2. QUOTE MR. CHAIRMAN, I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY ON OUR DEFENSE POLICY IN KOREA. BECAUSE THIS IS AN OPEN HEARING I WILL BE ADDRESSING SOME OF THE QUESTIONS WITH LESS DETAIL THAN IN A CLOSED SESSION.

3. I PROPOSE TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY THE MILITARY THREAT THE FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE US FACE, OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO THE ROK AND SOUTH KOREAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THEIR DEFENSES, AND FINALLY THE US MILITARY FORCE POSTURE IN KOREA.

UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 02 STATE 085247

4. THREAT -- I KNOW YOU HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED ON THE THREAT, BUT I WOULD JUST LIKE TO REEMPHASIZE:

-- THAT NORTH KOREA IS ONE OF THE MOST MILITARIZED

STATES IN THE WORLD, SPENDING PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 15 PERCENT OF ITS GNP ON DEFENSE.

-- THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE ASSEMBLED A FORMIDABLE MILITARY FORCE THAT IS OFFENSIVELY CONFIGURED AND CONCENTRATED ALONG THE DMZ. THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO LAUNCH A MAJOR SURPRISE ATTACK SOUTH ACROSS THE DMZ WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING.

-- THAT NORTH KOREAN FORCES ARE PARTICULARLY STRONG VIS-A-VIS THE SOUTH IN THEIR ARMOR CAPABILITY, IN THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF ARTILLERY CLOSE TO THE DMZ, AND IN THEIR AIR FORCE CONSISTING OF A SIZABLE NUMBER OF HIGH PERFORMANCE FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT.

-- THAT NORTH KOREA HAS A WELL DEVELOPED DEFENSE INDUSTRY, MUCH MORE SO THAN THAT IN SOUTH KOREA. THE NORTH PRODUCES MUCH OF ITS OWN HEAVY COMBAT EQUIPMENT.

-- THAT WITH RESPECT TO LOGISTICS, THE NORTH IS WELL PREPARED WITH LARGE PREPOSITIONED LOGISTIC STOCKPILES. IT HAS THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF SHARING CONTIGUOUS BORDERS WITH ITS MAJOR ALLIES, THE USSR AND THE PRC.

5. KOREAN FORCES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT -- THE SOUTH KOREANS ALSO HAVE A FORMIDABLE FORCE, MOSTLY DISPOSED IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS SOUTH OF THE DMZ. THESE FORCES ARE HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL, WELL-TRAINED, AND WELL-LED. THEY HAVE IMPROVED IMMEASURABLY SINCE THE KOREAN WAR. THEY ALSO HAVE THE BENEFIT OF ACTIVE COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM. IN IMPORTANT EQUIPMENT AREAS THEY ARE BEHIND THE NORTH KOREANS. THE SOUTH KOREANS PROVIDE MOST OF THE DEFENSE OF KOREA AND PAY FOR MOST OF IT THEMSELVES. THEY ARE DETERMINED TO IMPROVE THEIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 085247

FENSE CAPABILITIES.

6. THE MAJOR MODERNIZATION OF KOREAN FORCES BEGAN IN 1971 IN THE FORM OF A FIVE-YEAR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM (MOD PLAN), WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE US GOVERNMENT IN 1970. THE MOD PLAN CALLED FOR EXPENDITURE OF \$1.5 BILLION OVER THE PERIOD FY 1971-75 IN GRANTS, CREDITS, TRANSFERS, AND EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES (EDA). WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO MEET THE FIVE-YEAR GOAL BUT HOPE TO COMPLETE THE PROGRAM BY FY 1977.

7. THE MOD PLAN MADE A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITATIVE AND

QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT TO THE ROK FORCES. MAJOR ITEMS

INCLUDED IN THE MOD PLAN HAVE BEEN: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, SELF-PROPELLED AND 155MM AND 105MM ARTILLERY, SMALL ARMS AND MORTARS, TACTICAL RADIOS, AND OTHER COMBAT EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO MODERNIZE ROK FORCES. FIREPOWER HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED.

8. THE ROKG HAS RECENTLY DEVELOPED ITS OWN FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN (FIP) FOR THE 1975-80 TIME FRAME. THIS PLAN SUPPLEMENTS AND FOLLOWS THE TRENDS ESTABLISHED IN THE MODERNIZATION PLAN AND AIMS TO PUT THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMED FORCES ON A ROUGH PAR WITH NORTH KOREA'S.

9. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES PUT THE COST OF THE FIP AT ROUGHLY \$5 BILLION. TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY FINANCING THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT HAS INSTITUTED A DEFENSE TAX TO RAISE AN ADDITIONAL \$1.5 BILLION OVER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD COVERED BY THE FIP. IN 1976 OVER HALF OF THE BUDGET INCREASE WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND IN 1976 DEFENSE COSTS WILL RISE FROM LESS THAN 5 PERCENT TO OVER 7 PERCENT OF THE GNP. THIS VERY IMPRESSIVE JUMP ILLUSTRATES THE DEDICATION OF THE SOUTH KOREANS TO BE SELF-RELIANT.

10. THE SOUTH KOREANS NOW DETERMINE THEIR OWN FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND ESTABLISH THEIR OWN PRIORITIES. WE OFFER OUR ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE IN HELPING THEM
UNCLASSIFIED
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PAGE 04 STATE 085247

REACH DECISIONS. THE FOLLOWING MAJOR PROGRAMS ARE CONTAINED IN THE FIP:

-- GROUND FORCES WILL BE IMPROVED BY THE ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SIX REAR AREA DIVISIONS AND OF ADDITIONAL IN-COUNTRY PRODUCED ARTILLERY PIECES. SIGNIFICANT EFFORT WILL ALSO BE DEVOTED TO INCREASING AIR MOBILITY AND FORTIFICATION AND BARRIER MATERIELS. THE TANK FORCE WILL BE UPGRADED AND ADDITIONAL ANTI-TANK SYSTEMS WILL BE ACQUIRED. AIR DEFENSE PROJECTS INCLUDE THE TURNOVER OF US NIKE-HERCULES MISSILE SYSTEMS TO THE ROK.

-- IMPROVEMENTS IN THE AIR FORCE WILL LARGELY BE DEVOTED TO INCREASING SHARPLY THE NUMBER OF MODERN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN THE ROK AIR FORCE IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE PRESENT DISPARITY WITH THE NORTH.

-- NAVY EFFORTS WILL BE FOCUSED ON COASTAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH ACQUISITION OF NEW PATROL CRAFT AND SUITABLE MISSILE SYSTEMS.

11. THE US ROLE IN THE FIP IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM

OUR ROLE IN THE MODERNIZATION PLAN. INITIALLY, THE MODERNIZATION PLAN WAS FUNDED LARGELY BY GRANTS -- 95 PERCENT IN 1971 -- BUT GRANT AID HAS DECLINED TO A SMALL PROPORTION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE. TODAY WE ARE AT A POINT WHERE WE HAVE ESSENTIALLY ELIMINATED GRANT AID TO KOREA AND ARE PROVIDING FMS CREDITS TO HELP THE ROK OBTAIN THE NECESSARY FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO FINANCE DEFENSE OBJECTIVES. THE FIP IS AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN ROK MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY. WE SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FIP AND WILL REQUEST IN THE FUTURE SIGNIFICANT FMS CREDIT TO MEET MUTUALLY AGREED REQUIREMENTS. THE ROKG UNDERSTANDS THAT THE FIP IS THEIR OWN PROGRAM AND WE HAVE NOT MADE ANY MULTI-YEAR COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE PLAN. HOWEVER, PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF FIP GOALS IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN EVENTUALLY REDUCING THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN KOREA.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 085247

12. US MILITARY TROOP POSTURE -- WITH RESPECT TO US MILITARY TROOP POSTURE IN KOREA, DETERRENCE REMAINS OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN. FOR THE PAST 25 YEARS OUR MILITARY FORCES HAVE BEEN AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PEACE ARRANGEMENTS ON THE PENINSULA. OUR FORCES IN KOREA HELP DO THE FOLLOWING:

-- DETER NORTH KOREAN ATTACK

-- COMPENSATE FOR SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY DEFICIENCIES

-- DISCOURAGE OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR ANY NORTH KOREAN ADVENTURE.

13. IN THE REGION OUR CONTINUED DEPLOYMENTS REASSURE JAPAN AND OTHER ASIAN FRIENDS OF OUR CAPABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT OUR MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATIES AND REMAIN A PACIFIC POWER.

14. OUR FORCE LEVELS HAVE NOT REMAINED STATIC BUT HAVE DECLINED AS ROK CAPABILITIES HAVE GROWN. SINCE 1968 WE HAVE REDUCED OUR FORCES FROM 68,000 TO 42,000, AND ONE US DIVISION WAS WITHDRAWN IN 1971. THE ARMY PROVIDES THE BULK OF OUR FORCES -- AROUND 33,000 -- AND THE AIR FORCE HAS OVER 7,500. THE ONE US DIVISION REMAINING IS LOCATED IN RESERVE.

15. WE DO NOT THINK IT DESIRABLE TO REMOVE THE 2ND

US INFANTRY DIVISION FROM KOREA BECAUSE THIS MIGHT
EVENTUALLY PRECIPITATE WHAT WE HAVE TRIED TO AVOID --

THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES. WHILE WE CANNOT SAY WITH
ANY CERTAINTY WHEN IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO WITHDRAW OUR
FORCES COMPLETELY FROM SOUTH KOREA, IT IS OBVIOUSLY
NOT OUR INTENT TO LET THEM REMAIN THERE FOREVER. AT
A MINIMUM, TWO CONDITIONS MUST BE MET BEFORE THE US
COULD WITHDRAW MILITARILY WITHOUT DESTABILIZING THE AREA.

-- FIRST IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR SOUTH KOREAN
FORCES TO ACHIEVE PARITY WITH THOSE OF THE NORTH SO
UNCLASSIFIED
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PAGE 06 STATE 085247

THAT THEY COULD SERVE AS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT UNAIDED
BY US FORCES. PROVIDED THE NORTH DOES NOT ACCELERATE
SIGNIFICANTLY QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT
OF ITS FORCES, PARITY SHOULD GENERALLY BE ACHIEVED WHEN
DELIVERIES UNDER THE FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM ARE
COMPLETED.

-- SECONDLY CONDITIONS SUITABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL
ARE RELATED TO THE CLIMATE PREVAILING INTERNATIONALLY
AND SPECIFICALLY ON THE PENINSULA AND IN ASIA. IT
WOULD BE NO CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE TO WITHDRAW WHEN TEN-
SIONS IN THE AREA ARE HIGH. OBVIOUSLY IT IS NOT POSSI-
BLE TO PREDICT WITH ANY CERTAINTY WHEN THESE SATISFAC-
TORY INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS WILL PREVAIL.

16. WE CONSTANTLY HAVE OUR FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA --
AND ELSEWHERE IN ASIA -- UNDER REVIEW. WE WILL BE MAKING
CHANGES. WE WILL, FOR EXAMPLE, BE TURNING MORE AND MORE
OF THE AIR DEFENSE MISSION OVER TO THE KOREANS OVER THE
NEXT YEAR OR SO.

17. IN SUMMARY WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY
TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA, WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE
POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
SOUTH KOREA FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE, AND WE ARE HOPEFUL
THAT THE CONDITIONS I HAVE ENUMERATED ABOVE WILL BECOME
A REALITY SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. END QUOTE SISCO

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 15 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, US CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS, MILITARY PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 APR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE085247
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EA/K:JDFORBES:JDB
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760134-0054
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197604115/baaaeoma.tel
Line Count: 263
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: MartinML
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 JUN 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15 JUN 2004 by SilvaL0>; APPROVED <22 DEC 2004 by MartinML>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SFRC HEARING ON KOREA-ABRAMOWITZ STATEMENT
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, MARR, KS, KN, US
To: SEOUL
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006